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INTRODUCTION
Like many young women breaking into the working world, I spent some
time and effort looking for mentors. I managed to find two significant ones.
The first was a lesbian; the second was not. I mention this fact because, for
the purposes of this article, it is the most important aspect of the two
relationships.
My first mentor, Linda,1 hired me for my first job out of college. She was
my supervisor. Linda was an open lesbian; I was very young and still fairly
confused about my own sexuality. I certainly was not out as a lesbian either
to her or to my fellow workers. We worked closely together; she taught and
shaped me and I soaked it all in. We became close emotionally as well, sharing
lunches, occasional dinners, and confiding in one another about our lives
outside of work. We spent a lot of time together. People noticed. My friends
and colleagues asked me questions about the relationship. They were concerned
about me. They warned me to be careful.
My second mentor, Harriet, hired me for a legal internship one summer
while I was in law school. She too was my supervisor. I had graduated from
college seven years earlier and was fairly settled about my sexuality. I most
definitely was out as a lesbian to her, as well as to my co-workers and to
anyone else who asked. We worked closely together; she taught and shaped
me and I soaked it all in. We became close emotionally as well, just as Linda
and I had. People noticed. My friends and colleagues began asking me if we
were having an affair. I learned that her friends and colleagues were asking
her about the relationship. They were concerned about her. They told her to
be careful.
These two stories frame the problem explored below. These women were
both in their early forties when I came into their lives, and I was considerably
younger. They were both well-respected members of their professional
communities and contributed extensively to my professional and intellectual
development. They also became my good friends. Yet the two relationships
produced opposite reactions from friends and colleagues. The relationship
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between an apparently straight woman employee (me) and an openly lesbian
employer (Linda) prompted warnings and concern for me. The relationship
between an openly lesbian employee (me) and an apparently straight woman
employer (Harriet) prompted warnings and concern for her.
It is possible that the friendships with both mentors might have turned sour
eventually, and become so disruptive of my work that I would have felt forced
to quit both jobs. Could it be that as a straight subordinate against Linda, a
lesbian supervisor, I could have prevailed in a sexual harassment suit, but that
as a lesbian subordinate against Harriet, a straight supervisor, I would not have
stood a chance? The cases dealing with same-sex sexual harassment2 under
Title VIP over the past fifteen years suggest that those are exactly the
outcomes I could expect.
Federal and state courts have adopted three approaches to the problem of
same-sex sexual harassment: 1) Title VII does not apply; 2) Title VII does
apply; and, 3) Title VII may apply in cases between persons of the same
gender, but does not apply to the particular facts before the court. In other
words, the courts are confused, and the law in this area seems poised to
change. The media has focused increasingly on the problem of same-sex sexual
harassment;4 the internet is abuzz with queries and stories about female
2. "Same-sex sexual harassment" is used in this article to identify behavior that falls within the
common legal understanding of sexual harassment, and that involves a plaintiff and harasser of the same
gender. The term does not imply anything about the parties' sexual orientation.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1991). Unless otherwise noted, the cases referred to
in this article arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The statute prohibits discrimination
by an employer against an individual "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. at § 2000e-
2(a)(1).
In 1973, the Supreme Court laid out a four-part test for establishing a prima facie case of employment
discrimination under Title Vii: (1) the plaintiff must belong to a group enumerated in the statute; (2) the
plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job that the employer was trying to fill; (3) the plaintiff was
rejected; and, (4) after the rejection, the employer continued to attempt to fill the position. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
For general background on Title VII and sex discrimination, see HERMA HILL KAY, SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1988); Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166-69 (1971);
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1991); Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based
Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310-13 (1968); Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 884 (1967); Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Sexual Harassment
and Title VII-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1071-79 (1989); Marie Elena Peluso, Tempering
Title VII's Straight Arrow Approach: Recognizing and Protecting Gay Employees of Employment
Discrimination, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1533, 1533-37 (1993).
4. In addition to reporting on individual cases, newspapers have been running stories about the
growing problem" of same-sex sexual harassment. See, e.g., Susan Christian, Battle Against Same-Sex
Harassment Comes Out of the Closet, L.A. TIMEs, July 12, 1994, at 1 (calculating that such cases comprise
five percent of workplace complaints, and noting that percentage might grow "as gays become more
vocal"); Kim Clark, Man-to-Man Harassment in the Spotlight Today, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 28, 1995,
at IC (reporting that harassment suits brought by men against men are "increasingly common" and "an
increasingly hot legal issue"); Michael Janofsky, Gay Worker Accuses Male of Harassing Him Sexually,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A24 (describing rising number of complaints of same-sex sexual harassment
and lack of clear cut legal solution); L.N. Sixel, Wrongs Without Remedy: Federal Laws Offer Little Relief
From Same-Sex Harassment, HOUSTON CHRON. Sept. 17, 1995, at I (reporting that significant number
of 160 harassment suits filed by men with EEOC in Houston between October 1994 and September 1995
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employees "harassed" by female bosses; more suits are being brought;' there
is disagreement in the district courts concerning whether and how Title VII
should apply to same-sex sexual harassment.' Federal courts of appeals are
beginning to address these issues,7 suggesting at least the possibility that the
Supreme Court will consider them as well.
The natural reaction of feminist, lesbian, queer theory, and progressive
legal scholars and advocates seems to be to attempt to force same-sex sexual
harassment cases into the ambit of Title VII's protection against workplace
discrimination.' This Article argues, however, that Title VII as it currently
stands is not the appropriate vehicle for remedying same-sex sexual
harassment. Using the current statute would in fact create more problems than
solutions.
On its face, Title VII does not prohibit sexual harassment. Rather, feminist
legal theorists developed a cause of action based on Title VII's prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of gender.9 In addition, Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."0 The source of the
were against other men); Thom Weidlich, Cases Drawing the Line on Same-Sex Harassing, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 13, 1995, at A9 (discussing spate of opinions handed down since late 1980s on sexual harassment
of men by men).
5. Indeed, the number of cases has mushroomed even since I began work on this Article. As of the
date of publication, a computer search for cases involving "homosexual or same-sex or same-gender sexual
harassment" produced the following results: 19 cases since January 1, 1995; 3 cases between January 1,
1994 and December 31, 1994; and 10 cases total between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1993.
6. See infra notes 76 and 83.
7. To date, only one court of appeals has ruled on this issue. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am.,
28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that Title VII does not apply to same-sex sexual harassment).
However, a number of appeals from district court decisions are pending. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 95-1209 (4th Cir. 1995). Judge
Posner has commented on this issue as well. See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th
Cir. 1995) (dictum) ("Sexual harassment of women by men is the most common kind, but we do not mean
to exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by
other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases."). Baskerville has been called "the
definitive opinion on Title VII sexual harassment." Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, 896 F. Supp. 805, 806
(N.D. Ind. 1995) (Sharp., C.J.).
8. See, e.g., Proposed Brief Amici Curiae of the Women's Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation et al. at 3, Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md.
1994), appeal docketed, No. 95-1209 (4th Cir. 1995) (arguing that "Title VII protects victims of sexual
harassment regardless of the gender of the victim and the harasser" and that proper focus is not gender
of those involved or harasser's motivation but "effect of the conduct on the victim").
I say the "natural" reaction because these groups share the common goal of protecting oppressed
minorities-in this case, lesbians and gay men-from injustice and discrimination at the hands of the
majority. If the victims of same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace are lesbians and gay men, then,
it is natural for those opposed to such victimization to try to use Title VII-the main tool available to rid
the workplace of discrimination-to protect lesbians and gay men. However, the victims of same-sex sexual
harassment are not only lesbians and gay men. Indeed, they tend to be straight men and women accusing
lesbians and gay men of harassing them. See infra notes 76 and 83.
9. See infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
10. I use the terms discrimination and harassment "on the basis of sexual orientation" to describe the
universe of behavior that targets an individual because of his or her sexual orientation, that is, her or his
homosexuality. Unlike the term "same-sex sexual harassment," this term does imply something about a
party's sexual orientation. If a woman is claiming to be harassed based on her sexual orientation, this
implies that she is a lesbian, or perceived to be a lesbian. By not providing protection for discrimination
or harassment based on sexual orientation, Title VII explicitly does not protect gay men and lesbians from
discrimination or harassment based on the fact that they are gay men and lesbians.
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courts' inconsistency in applying Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment is
the lack of doctrinal guidance for how to apply Title VII to sexuality, as
distinct from sex or gender, and to sexual orientation." As a result, gay
sexuality and straight sexuality have been treated differently in the
workplace.' 2
This article argues that the proper starting point is to provide protection
for gay men and lesbians against discrimination and harassment. Until there
is such protection, any attempt to use Title VII to regulate same-sex sexual
harassment will intensify the privileging of one kind of same-sex interaction
over another: straight subordinates will be protected from gay supervisors,
while gay subordinates will not be protected from straight supervisors. The
result will be increased tolerance not for expressions of gay and lesbian
sexuality, but for expressions of heterosexism and homophobia in the
workplace.
Part I of this article examines the development of the sexual harassment
cause of action as a form of discrimination on the basis of gender. It argues
that same-sex sexual harassment does not fit within the theory of traditional
sexual harassment. Part II chronicles the courts' historical exclusion of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation from Title VII's coverage.
11. Much has been written on the differences between these characteristics. Bennett Capers suggests
that sex refers "to 'the biological aspects of a person such as the chromosomal, anatomical, hormonal, and
physiological structure,'" I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and 7itle VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158,
1160 (1991) (quoting L.W. RICHARDSON, THE DYNAMICS OF SEX AND GENDER: A SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 5 (1977)), while gender refers to "characteristics traditionally labelled 'masculine' and
'feminine' and is a function of socialization, having social, cultural and psychological components," id.
at 1160 (citing C. FRANKLIN, THE CHANGING DEFINITION OF MASCULINITY 2 (1984)). For different views
on this issue, see SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER (1993); Charlotte Bunch, Not for
Lesbians Only, in BUILDING FEMINIST THEORY: ESSAYS FROM QUEST 67 (1981).
With regard to sexual orientation, much has been written to suggest that sexuality exists on a
continuum. See, e.g., ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY
AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 53-61 (1978); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 636-55 (1948); Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1131-32 (1979). Janet Halley questions what the terms
"heterosexual" and "homosexual" really describe:
I use the terms 'homosexuality' and 'homosexual'-and more tendentiously, the terms
'heterosexuality' and 'heterosexual'-without any implication that they accurately describe any
persons living or dead. As I try to use them here, these terms describe rhetorical categories that
have real, material importance notwithstanding their failure to provide adequate descriptions of
any one of us.
Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1721, 1723 (1993).
12. Obviously the workplace is not the only place where gay sexuality is treated differently. The
Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), that the Constitution's guarantee of
the right to privacy does not require protection for homosexual sodomy. Thus, the Supreme Court paved
the way for statutes criminalizing homosexual sexual activity. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v.
Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648, 655 (1987).
For an overview of the "rights that lesbians and gays do not have," Capers, supra note 11, at 1165
n.26, see Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989).
For a history of homosexuality, persecution of homosexuals, and attempts at liberation from such
persecution, see JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE
IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
(1980); DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988).
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Part III analyzes the cases that have addressed the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment. Part IV examines other areas of sexuality that the state has the
power to regulate. The article concludes that applying Title VII to same-sex
sexual harassment would rely on and perpetuate society's commitment to
regulate, if not to prohibit, any "abnormal" expressions of sexuality. 3
I. TITLE VII Is ABOUT GENDER
In one of the most significant contributions made by feminist jurisprudence
to mainstream legal thought, Catharine MacKinnon argued that sexual
harassment was a form of gender discrimination. 4 Using race discrimination
as an analogy," she described sexual harassment as "situations of persistent
verbal suggestion, unwanted physical contact, straightforward proposition, and
coerced intercourse . . .[including] [i]nsult, pressure, or intimidation having
gender as its basis or referent."6
The original cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII was
based on a prohibition against a quid pro quo interaction in which an employer
13. Though many of the arguments set out in this article apply equally to lesbians and gay men, my
focus is primarily on how application of Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment will affect the rights of
lesbians in the workplace. Parts II and IlI address issues that affect both groups in the same or similar ways
and so implicitly or explicitly include gay men in the analysis. Parts I and IV, however, address issues
unique to lesbians, and exclude gay men, and all other non-lesbians, from the analysis.
14. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN]. There,
MacKinnon distinguishes "two distinct concepts of discrimination," which she terms the "differences"
approach and the "inequality" approach, both of which can be used to show that sexual harassment is sex
discrimination. Id. at 4.
The ]differences] approach envisions the sexes as socially as well as biologically different from
one another, but calls impermissible or "arbitrary" those distinctions or classifications that are
found preconceived and/or inaccurate. The linequality] approach understands the sexes to be not
simply socially differentiated but socially unequal. In this broader view, all practices which
subordinate women to men are prohibited.
Id. This part of the article sets out in brief the inequality approach, but also refers to and critiques certain
features of the differences approach. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
MacKinnon's arguments convinced other feminist theorists, scholars, and ultimately judges. See
Estrich, supra note 3, at 818 (discussing MacKinnon's influence); Peirce, supra note 3, at 1079-87 (same).
The first case to hold that sexual harassment was illegal sex discrimination was Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). The cause of action has since become well-established in the courts.
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 103, 109, 254 n.13 (1987) [hereinafter
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission added to its guidelines a section specifically
prohibiting sexual harassment:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a) (1991) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines].
15. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 208-13.
16. Id. at 237.
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demands sexual favors or a sexual relationship in exchange for job benefits,
a promotion, or the job itself. 7 As MacKinnon's description suggests, the
cause of action has evolved to incorporate the concept of a hostile work
environment-an atmosphere so charged with sexuality directed at a woman
that she cannot work effectively.'" A hostile environment may be created by
comments by colleagues or supervisors, "touching, posters or cartoons in the
work area," or any "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a
woman's sex role over her function as a worker."19
Such behavior is regulated by Title VII because the statute seeks to
eliminate unequal gender-based treatment in the workplace. When a male
supervisor or colleague creates an environment so focused on a woman's
sexuality that she cannot do her job comfortably, he reinforces stereotypes
about dominant and submissive sex roles, and he perpetuates the identification
of women with sex.2" When a woman has to deal with the sexual pressures
created by this environment, she is forced to focus her energy in ways that a
man in her position would not have to do. Such a dissipation of her effort
affects her ability to achieve the employment security and rewards that her
male colleagues achieve.2' The workplace becomes an exaggerated reflection
of the problem of inequality women suffer in society as a whole.22
Courts rarely have spelled out this "inequality argument."23 Plaintiffs in
sexual harassment cases generally have relied upon a "disparate treatment"
argument: sexual harassment by a supervisor singles out women and holds
17. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), is the classic quid pro quo case. The court of
appeals reversed the district court and held that the employer's conduct did violate the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972.
18. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that demeaning insults and
propositions can constitute sexual harassment); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th
Cir. 1982) (holding that appellant made prima facie case showing of sexual harassment severe and persistent
enough to constitute Title VII claim). The Supreme Court recognized this claim in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Meritor the Court recognized the existence of both quid pro quo and
hostile work environment sexual harassment, and found that they were both prohibited by Title VII. Id.
at 64-66. The Supreme Court recently affirmed the holding of Meritor in Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S.
Ct. 367 (1993). For a helpful discussion of Meritor, see Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment:
Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 161-68 (1994).
19. LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 14-15
(1978). The EEOC Guidelines prohibit "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" in both quid pro quo and hostile workplace situations. EEOC
Guidelines, supra note 14, at § 1604.11.
20. Judith Butler describes this identification as the "conflation of the category of women with the
ostensibly sexualized features of their bodies." JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 19 (1990).
21. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 209-10.
22. See id. at 235. MacKinnon explains:
[Elach incident [of sexual harassment] reproduces, with very little personal variation, the
inequitable social structure of male supremacy and female subordination which Titles VII and
IX seek to eliminate in proscribing sex discrimination as a factor in employment and in education.
Far from being simply individual and personal, sexual harassment is integral and crucial
to a social context in which women, as a group, are allocated a disproportionately small share
of wealth, power, and advantages compared with men as a group.
Id.
23. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 14, at 107.
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them to a different employment standard.24 Courts use a "but for" causation
test to determine whether the behavior complained of was gender
discrimination under Title VII: but for plaintiff's gender, would she have been
treated the same way? If the answer is no, the court finds that Title VII has
been violated. If the answer is yes, the court finds no violation.'
Employing this reasoning, courts have found women liable for harassing
men-but for his gender he would not have been harassed. While this result
may seem counterintuitive, in light of the fact that the sexual harassment
doctrine was designed to protect women, the "differences" approach which
MacKinnon outlines alongside the "inequality" approach26 supports the
result.27 The differences approach argues that a woman who has achieved a
powerful position is capable of sexually harassing subordinate male employees,
having assumed the "false consciousness" of a man. With power comes its
trappings, one of which is the ability to sexually harass.28 Courts also have
accepted the so-called "bisexual defense": if a supervisor has harassed both
male and female subordinates, there has been no "but for" gender causation,
and no gender discrimination has taken place.29
24. See cases cited supra notes 17-18.
25. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("We notefl that in each instance
the question is one of but-for causation: would the complaining employee have suffered the harassment
had he or she been of a different gender?"); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("In each instance, the legal problem . . . [is] the exaction of a condition which, but for his or her sex,
the employee would not have faced."). For a useful discussion of the application of the but-for standard,
see Peirce, supra note 3, at 1087-90.
26. For differentiation of these two approaches in MacKinnon's analysis, see supra note 14.
27. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 203 ("By the logic
of the differences argument, if a sexual condition of employment were imposed equally upon both women
and men by the same employer, the practice would no longer constitute sex discrimination because it would
not be properly based on the gender difference.").
28. See id. at 202. Here the differences approach reveals its lack of "radical" vision. See generally
Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 831 (1990) ("Radical feminists
complain ... that to argue on the basis of women's similarity to men merely assimilates women into an
unchanged male sphere. In a sense, the result is to make women into men.").
Indeed, it is a common tactic of heterosexism and sexism to call women in positions of power "men"
or "lesbians" in trying to maintain the patriarchal status quo. See, e.g., Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin
S. Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional Fields: Casualties ofthe Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 234 (1990) ("Calling servicewomen 'lesbians' is one way for servicemen
to maintain their sense of masculinity when traditional gender distinctions based on job field begin to break
down."); id. at 237 ("Another way to avoid demasculinization when a woman does a 'man's job' is to make
her not a woman. Women who perform 'men's jobs' are 'classed as deviants' 'man-women' and lesbians.")
(footnotes omitted).
29. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55 (distinguishing but-for causation situation from
situation involving "a bisexual superior who conditions the employment opportunities of a subordinate of
either gender upon participation in a sexual affair" because in the latter case "the insistence upon sexual
favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees
alike"). But see Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
district court erred in agreeing with defendant that superior's conduct was not sexual harassment because
he consistently abused men and women alike); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334,
1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) (holding that "equal harassment of both genders does not escape the purview of Title
VII in the instant case"). For a helpful discussion of this issue as it arose in Chiapuzio, see Kristi J.
Johnson, Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corporation: What Does it Mean to Be Harassed "Because of" Your
Sex?: Sexual Stereotyping and the "Bisexual"Harasser Revisited, 79 IOWA L. REV. 731, 739-46 (1994).
The differences approach also supports the conclusion that "if a sexual condition of employment were
imposed equally upon both women and men by the same employer, the practice would no longer constitute
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While compelling on its face, if only for the apparent neutrality and
administrative ease it provides, this argument risks sacrificing the end for the
means. This "but for" analysis ignores the essence of the offensive behavior,
which is the perpetuation of a disparate power structure between men and
women, and the reduction of women to their sexual selves.3" Indeed, while the
neutrality of a court's "but for" causation may look inviting, it is the very lack
of neutrality that creates the sexual harassment. MacKinnon, reflecting ten
years after the first case of sexual harassment had been litigated, writes:
Sexual harassment . . . inhabits what I call hierarchies among men:
arrangements in which some men are below other men, as in
employer/employee and teacher/student . . . . But it also happens
among coworkers, from third parties, even by subordinates in the
workplace, men who are women's hierarchical inferiors or peers.
Basically, it is done by men to women regardless of relative position
on the formal hierarchy.
31
Thus, sexual harassment was incorporated into Title VII because the
universe of behavior known as sexual harassment constitutes disparate
treatment on the basis of gender. The theory, by definition, relies on a
heterosexual model of interaction. It becomes necessarily more difficult, if not
entirely unworkable, when applied to a homosexual context. As MacKinnon
aptly noted when developing the theory, "the problem with gay harassment
is that it does not involve a difference between the sexes. "32
The concerns that Title VII seeks to address in prohibiting sexual
harassment simply are not present in a same-sex situation. The essence of a
hostile work environment claim is that the behavior perpetuates disparities of
power between men and women. 33 This phenomenon does not occur when all
the actors are the same sex. Recognizing this fact, the court in Goluszek v.
sex discrimination because it would not be properly based on gender difference." MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 203.
30. While the differences approach that MacKinnon outlines supports the "but-for" analysis, the
resultant perpetuation of a disparate power structure between men and women is precisely the sort of more
deeply rooted problem to which MacKinnon's inequality argument is addressed. See MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 5 ("The inequality approach . . . sees women's
situation as a structural problem of enforced inferiority that needs to be radically altered."). MacKinnon
notes that a troubling feature of the differences doctrine is that it "presumes a symmetry of power between
the sexes, when women have been subordinate as well as distinct." Id. at 221. See also id. at 192 ("To
take the differences approach requires temporary suspension of the fact that the sexes are substantively
unequal, not just different, a fact which calls into question the appropriateness of presuming equality in
order to measure disparity."). Despite its ideological flaws, though, the differences approach can be used
to show that sexual harassment is sex discrimination and thus "can be a useful corrective to sexism." Id.
at 4.
31. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 14, at 107.
32. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 204.
33. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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Smith" refused to apply Title VII to the hostile work environment claim of
a male plaintiff against a group of male co-workers.
5
The Goluszek court held that, despite the offensiveness of the behavior
alleged, 36 "the defendant's conduct was not the type of conduct Congress
intended to sanction when it enacted Title VII."'7 The type of conduct Title
VII does sanction is that "stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse
of that imbalance by the powerful which results in discrimination against a
discrete and vulnerable group."31 Since Goluszek was a man working in an
environment dominated by men, the court rejected his argument that, as a
male, he was treated as inferior. The court stated, "In fact, Goluszek may have
been harassed 'because' he is a male, but that harassment was not of a kind
which created an anti-male environment in the work place."39
Goluszek's harassers were other men. They derived their power over him
from their seniority and his eagerness to be accepted by them, not by virtue
of their gender. Outside of the workplace, they were all on an equal footing;
the only power the harassers had was that they were higher in the workplace
hierarchy. Outside of the workplace, Goluszek and his buddies could easily
have turned around and created the same sexualized atmosphere with the same
result. Goluszek's inability to concentrate on his work was the result of unfair
workplace distractions-comparable to a situation in which a colleague is rude
to him, does not like him, or singles him out for mean treatment. There was
no inherent power imbalance, no perpetuation of the sexualization of women
by men, no reflection of the victim's lower economic and social status. The
court found that the case was essentially about boys being boys and, as often
happens in such cases, somebody ended up getting hurt. But the somebody here
was a boy too. So the behavior was not discrimination prohibited by Title
VII. 40
The theory of sexual harassment developed by MacKinnon could support
the conclusion that that behavior was discrimination because her theory
suggests that those in positions of power-women or men-can and do create
hostile work environments for those in positions of relatively little power.
MacKinnon reaches this conclusion by arguing that women constantly are and
34. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. III. 1988).
35. Id. at 1456.
36. The complaint alleged that a number of machine operators questioned Goluszek about his love
life, told him he needed to "get married and get some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the legs
of a woman," and suggested that he go out with another female employee because she "fucks." Id. at 1453.
37. Id. at 1456.
38. Id.
39. Id. In so reasoning, the court implicitly rejected previous courts' "wooden application of the verbal
formulations created by the courts." Id.
40. For many years, the "boys will be boys" argument shielded heterosexual men from accusations
of sexual harassment against women, as courts saw such behavior as merely a normal expression of male
heterosexuality. What MacKinnon did was demonstrate that allowing these boys to be boys flew in the face
of Title VIl's committment to free the workplace of gender discrimination.
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always have been subordinate to men.4' Taken to its logical end, this view
argues that, even when men are not there, women who have assumed
traditional male power roles behave like men.42 This traditional theory when
applied to an all-woman situation not only ignores women who don't define
themselves as heterosexual, but also rejects the possibility that with each other
women have an existence separate and distinct from their relationships with
men. Lesbians, for example, exist at least in part outside the sphere of men,
and hence out from under their domination. By denying such an existence,
MacKinnon's theory of sexual harassment, premised as it is on the "fact" that
all women are constantly and always subordinate to men, denies an essential
part of the lesbian experience.43
Mary Dunlap, a lesbian, confronted MacKinnon on her subordination
theory:
I am not subordinate to any man! I find myself very often contesting
efforts at my subordination-both standing and lying down and sitting
and in various other positions-but I am not subordinate to any man!
And I have been told by Kitty MacKinnon that women have never not
been subordinate to man. So I stand here an exception .... 4
In making this claim, Dunlap was not asserting that she was stronger than
other (straight) women, nor was she denying that in society as a whole men
have greater power than women. She simply was offering her own
"experiential reality"45 in contrast to the reality that MacKinnon had attributed
to all women. Patricia Cain has explained that the statement was one which
41. Isabel Marcus et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF.
L. REV. 11, 71 (1985).
42. Ellen C. DuBois has made this point. See id. at 70 (questioning MacKinnon's
subordination/domination framework and arguing that it is circular reasoning to conclude that if a woman
is on top then she is male). See also MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra
note 14, at 202 (arguing that under differences approach, women in positions of power have "succeeded
to the forms of power which traditionally have been the province of men .... [They have] also succeeded
to that aspect of sex role that has been peculiarly male cultural behavior . . ").
43. A common criticism of radical or "dominance" theorists like MacKinnon is that they tend to ignore
lesbian experience. See Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 202-04 (1989). Cain's view is that MacKinnon responds to claims that the lesbian
reality is different from a heterosexual woman's by asserting that "exceptions do not matter." Id. at 202.
"It does not affect her theory that all women are not always subordinated to men. Thus, for MacKinnon,
lesbian experience of non-subordination is simply irrelevant." Id. In Ruthann Robson's view, MacKinnon
goes further, arguing that lesbians "cannot do otherwise than appropriate male values." Ruthann Robson,
Incendiary Categories: Lesbians/Violence/Law, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 n.3 (1993). Robson argues that
"for MacKinnon, sexuality may be 'so gender marked that it carries dominance and submission with it,
whatever the gender of its participants.'" Id. (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 142 (1989)).
44. Marcus et al., supra note 41, at 75. MacKinnon subsequently described Dunlap's statement as
a "stunning example of the denial of gender." MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 14, at
305 n.6.
45. Cain, supra note 43, at 212.
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Dunlap "felt compelled to make because MacKinnon's description of 'what
is' had continued to exclude Dunlap's reality."'
That reality-an individual, experiential reality free from male
domination-exists for women in a workplace environment that is free of men.
Power dynamics among women are different from those between men and
women, whether or not the women are lesbians. Male bosses, or male work
colleagues, carry with them "socially constructed power, privilege, and
credibility, as well as physical power."47 In an environment such as that
described by Dunlap, "the power dynamics are not necessarily as clear and
entrenched. " " Rather than being socially constructed, the power dynamics
between female bosses and female employees, or between female colleagues,
have their source within the workplace.
Frances Olsen has remarked that antidiscrimination law "obscures for
women the actual causes of their oppression."' Insisting on the neutrality
of the word "sex" in Title VII does just that. Sexual harassment is about male
subordination of females-a power dynamic unique to that interaction.
Suggesting that it simply is about treating people on the job differently
"because of their sex" obscures the essence of the offensive behavior: the
socially constructed power differential that exists between men and women.
Moreover, if we insist that "harassment" of women by women on the job is
a form of gender discrimination because the women harassers have assumed
positions of male superiority, we serve only to entrench our subordination and
deny any alternative reality we might experience free from our relationships
with men. In short, by seeking to call same-sex sexual harassment gender
discrimination, we are denying that women exist apart from men, as women.
II. TITLE VII Is NOT ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION
At the same time that courts were expanding Title VII's prohibition against
employment discrimination on the basis of gender to include sexual
harassment, they were refusing to read the same statute broadly enough to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Title VII does not
protect gay men and lesbians from discrimination in the workplace. Title VII
thus offers no doctrinal basis to prohibit same-sex sexual harassment. Reading
the statute to encompass such a prohibition would perpetuate an atmosphere
46. Id. Cain describes that different "experiential reality" by asking "how would you feel about this
[important love] relationship if it had to be kept utterly secret?" Id. at 207. She further describes the
difference by asking readers to consider "the plight of lesbians and gay men who risk the loss of job and
family by speaking the truth about their lives." Cain, supra note 28, at 846.
47. Tamara Packard & Melissa Schraibman, Lesbian Pornography: Escaping the Bonds of Sexual
Stereotypes and Strengthening our 7ies to One Another, 4 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 299, 312 (1994).
48. Id.
49. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv.
L. REV. 1497, 1552 (1983).
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of homophobia in the workplace, while providing no protection for the victims
of such an atmosphere.5"
Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of race, religious creed, color,
national origin, or sex.51 In Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co., lesbian and gay male employees who had been either
terminated or denied promotions challenged, under California law, Pacific
Telephone's alleged policy of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
They argued that the California equivalent of Title VII, the Fair Employment
Practices Act,53 prohibits all discrimination in employment on any basis other
than bona fide occupational qualification, and that the categories enumerated
in the statute-race, sex, creed, color, national origin, etc.-were illustrative
rather than restrictive. In rejecting this argument, the court held that the statute
on its face "provides no support whatever for the position that every form of
job discrimination [including that based on sexual orientation] . . . is
prohibited.""
Moreover, courts have not been inclined to read beyond the face of the
statute to interpret the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of gender
to mean anything other than "to place women on an equal footing with
men. "" Specifically, in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,56
the Ninth Circuit held unequivocally that "Title VII's prohibition of 'sex'
discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should
not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as
homosexuality."" As far as the courts are concerned, then, Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.58
50. See Packard and Schraibman, supra note 47, at 304 (making related argument with respect to
antipornography laws).
51. For the relevant text of Title VII, see supra note 3.
52. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1977).
53. That statute provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification...
(a) For an employer because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, physical handicap, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, or
sex of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the
person for a training program leading to employment, or to bar or discharge the person
from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to
discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges
of employment.
Cal. Gov't. Code § 12940 (West 1992).
54. Gay Law Students Ass'n, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
55. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
56. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). In this case, male and female homosexuals brought civil rights
actions claiming that their employers or potential employers had discriminated against them because of their
homosexuality: they were not hired, not promoted, harassed on the job because of their homosexuality.
They argued that Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex includes sexual
orientation. In the alternative, they argued that they could establish that discrimination against homosexuals
disproportionately affects men and is, thus, under a disparate impact theory, discrimination on the basis
of sex.
57. Id. at 329-30 (footnote omitted).
58. There are numerous arguments made to the effect that Title VII should prohibit such
discrimination. Full coverage of those arguments is beyond the scope of this article, but for an introduction
to the issues, see Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
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It should come as no surprise that courts have been just as unequivocal
in finding that harassment on the basis of sexual orientation is not sexual
harassment prohibited by Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of gender. In Carreno v. IBEW Local No. 226,1" Carreno, a gay man,
alleged that he was subjected to constant sexual harassment by his male co-
workers, such as being called "Mary" and "faggot," and having his genitals
and buttocks caressed, among other physical assaults. Noting that the issue was
"whether a homosexual male may recover under Title VII" for harassment by
"co-workers who disapprove of his homosexual lifestyle,"60 the court held
that Carreno had failed to plead a prima facie case for discrimination under
the statute because the harassment he complained of was not based on his
gender.6
The Sixth Circuit was quick to follow suit. The plaintiff in Dillon v.
Frank" was a man perceived to be gay by his co-workers. He alleged
extensive physical and verbal harassment, such as being subjected to verbal
and written taunts of "fag," "Dillon sucks dick," and "Dillon gives head," as
well as physical assaults.63 Dillon argued that Title VII's prohibition against
discrimination "because of sex" means "because of anything relating to being
male or female, sexual roles or sexual behavior." The court rejected this
argument and held that Title VII prohibits only discrimination "based on being
male or female."' The court found that the hostile work environment plaintiff
complained of was based not on his being male, but rather on his co-workers'
vehement "disapproval" of plaintiff's "alleged homosexuality."65 Thus, the
court concluded, such actions, "although cruel," are not prohibited by Title
VII.
Discrimination Under 7-tle VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1 (1992). Marcosson argues that harassment on the basis
of sexual orientation is gender discrimination.
Because it was sexual in nature, the harassment reinforced male-created and male-dominated
norms regarding the appropriateness of sexual conversation and conduct in the workplace. In this
sense, it was directed at women, even if the immediate target was a man.
More fundamentally, antigay harassment ... is "targeted" at women because it reinforces
stereotypes about appropriate gender roles. The reinforcement of stereotypes is antithetical to
Title VII.
Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted). For other views, see Capers, supra note 11, at 1159 (1991) (arguing that
antigay discrimination is equivalent to sexual stereotyping which was ruled Title VII violation in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 284 (1994) (arguing that taboo against
homosexuality reinforces inequality of sexes, which in large part is why the taboo exists); Heidi Sorenson,
A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81
GEO. L.J. 2105, 2111 (1993) (reasoning that a "dynamic interpretation" of Title VII argues for extension
of its prohibitions to discrimination based on sexual orientation).
59. No. 89-4083-S, 1990 WL 159199 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990).
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. (relying on DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (1979)).
62. No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id. at *7.
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In both DeSantis and Carreno, the plaintiffs were victims of same-sex
sexual harassment. The only reason they lost is that they were gay or perceived
to be gay. Carreno's lawyer apparently knew the landscape of Title VII
jurisprudence well enough not to allege that Carreno had been harassed on the
basis of his sexual orientation, knowing that such a cause of action would fail
after DeSantis and its progeny. That strategy made no difference to the court.
Since the record clearly showed that Carreno was gay, the court found that
his sexual orientation was the impetus for his harassment.66 Therefore, the
court concluded that the harassment and discrimination were based on sexual
orientation, and thus were not actionable under Title VII.
Given these decisions, if courts decide to extend Title VII's protection to
victims of same-sex sexual harassment, courts will have to ask which kind has
occurred: harassment based on sexual orientation or harassment based on
gender. Plaintiffs who are gay or appear to be gay will lose because the court
will view their harassment as "based on sexual orientation" and therefore not
covered by Title VII. Plaintiffs who are straight or appear to be straight will
win because the court will view their harassment as "based on gender" and
therefore covered by Title VII.
To be clear, whether or not Title VII should prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is irrelevant to this Article's argument.67 If Title
VII did protect gay men and lesbians from workplace harassment, the analysis
of whether same-sex sexual harassment should be prohibited by that statute
would be very different. But Title VII provides no such protection. Further,
it does not appear that courts or legislatures are eager to extend Title VII's
protection to gay men and lesbians at any time soon. As long as Title VII
excludes homosexuality as a protected category, any attempt to use Title VII
to regulate some same-sex interaction in the workplace will send a dangerous
mixed message: it is okay to make a workplace miserable for a dyke or a
faggot, or for someone who looks or acts like a dyke or a faggot, but it is not
okay to make a workplace miserable for a straight man or woman, or for
someone who looks or acts like a straight man or woman. That message is
unacceptable.6"
66. Carreno, 1990 WL 159199 at *3. "While the plaintiff has expressly stated that he is not asserting
discrimination based on sexual preference, the undisputed facts indicate that the plaintiff was not harassed
because he is a male, but rather because he is a homosexual male." Id.
67. Gay rights activists and legal scholars alike argue that Title VII should be read to include such
discrimination. See supra note 58.
68. As Adrienne Rich has cautioned, feminist theory that "contributes to lesbian invisibility or
marginality is actually working against the liberation and empowerment of woman as a group." Adrienne
Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNs 631, 647-48 (1980). Rich argues that
"it is not enough for feminist thought that specifically lesbian texts exist. Any theory or cultural/political
creation that treats lesbian existence as a marginal or less 'natural' phenomenon, as mere 'sexual
preference,' or as the mirror image of either heterosexual or male homosexual relations, is profoundly
weakened thereby." Id. at 632. For another take on lesbian marginalization, see Ruth Colker, The Example
of Lesbians: Posthumous Reply to Professor Mary Joe Frug, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1086 (1992)
("[Clertain women have always been excluded from the category 'female' to facilitate the socialization of




The traditional theory of sexual harassment as gender discrimination,
combined with Title VII jurisprudence that excludes protection for gay men
and lesbians in the workplace, would seem to dictate that courts throw out all
claims of same-sex sexual harassment. Courts, however, have not been
deterred by the doctrinal inconsistency of using Tide VII to prohibit same-sex
sexual harassment. In applying Tide VII to such situations, the courts have
relied on society's notion of "normal" sexuality and stereotypes about lesbians
and gay men.69
The hostile work environment doctrine grew out of the theory that it was
discrimination against women to create a highly sexualized work atmosphere
because such an atmosphere creates terms and conditions of employment that
are different for men and women. This theory differs from the traditional
theory of gender discrimination. Saying that all women can't be plumbers
because they are women is discrimination against all women. Sexual
harassment involves the sexual characteristics of the particular person being
harassed; it is discrimination against a particular woman by a man (or men)
who focuses on her as a sexual being rather than as an employee.7'
Put another way, by prohibiting sexual harassment, Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of (hetero)sexuality. But Tide VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on homosexuality. In order to find same-sex sexual
harassment actionable, then, a court would have to determine which kind of
sexuality was the basis of the discrimination. If based on heterosexuality, the
harassment would be actionable; if based on homosexuality, it would not be
actionable.
Imagine the following workplace environment: A group of straight women
are sitting around on their coffee or lunch break chatting about their boyfriends
and husbands. One describes a date she had over the weekend. She didn't sleep
with him, but he wanted her to. She doesn't know if she's really that attracted
to him. They fooled around, but when it came down to getting out the condom,
she just wasn't that into it. The other women nod sympathetically and describe
from the category 'female.'").
69. Such reliance by courts on their own views of homosexuality in order to decide cases is hardly
new, or confined to the area of sexual harassment. Much has been written on how the Bowers decision,
refusing to extend the constitutional right to privacy to protection for "homosexual sodomy," reflected the
Supreme Court's homophobia. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1770 (1993) (characterizing the Bowers decision
as Court's "exercise of homophobic power"); Stoddard, supra note 12, at 655 (arguing that "utter lack
of reasoning in the majority's opinion . . . strongly suggests that the explanation lies in the emotional
response of five justices to the subject matter underlying the case as they perceived it, or rather, as they
reconstituted it: the subject of homosexuality"); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical
Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (1993) (arguing that Bowers reflects
"homophobic ideology"); Brett J. Williamson, Note, The Constitutional Privacy Doctrine after Bowers
v. Hardwick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1327
(1989) (arguing that Hardwick outcome was due to "thinly veiled prejudice on the part of the majority").
70. Marcosson, supra note 58, at 32-33.
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similar situations they've encountered. One jumps in with her own weekend
activities-just the opposite. She went out with the hottest guy and could not
wait to get him home and into bed. And once she got him there, she was not
disappointed: he was as good as he looked. The women laugh encouragingly.
The conversation continues in the same vein, all about men, all about sex with
men. A highly sexualized atmosphere. One of the women-either in the circle
but not participating or out of the circle but within earshot-is a lesbian. She
feels excluded and alienated by all this sex talk about men-by this expression
of sexuality in the workplace.
Now imagine the same workplace environment, but the sexual orientation
of the group is reversed. The women in the circle are lesbians. They are
laughing and chatting about their girlfriends and partners. One describes a
really cute girl she picked up over the weekend and went home with her but
didn't spend the night-hopes she'll call because she had an amazing body and
promised to be great in bed. Another talks about her break-up with her
girlfriend after walking in on her having sex with another woman in their bed.
Another asks if everyone is going to "Girls Night" at the local gay bar; a
couple nod enthusiastically, but some say "no, you always see the same old
things-we want to find some new young ones." The woman outside the circle,
the straight woman, feels alienated and excluded from all this sex talk about
other woman.
These hypotheticals describe relatively mild scenarios, extreme versions
of which appear in the confused landscape of same-sex sexual harassment
caselaw. Three cases with remarkably disparate outcomes illustrate the point.
In Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co. ,71 a male plaintiff testified that
he had been subjected to genital-grabbing, attempted mounting, sexually
suggestive gestures, and crude remarks by a male co-employee.72 Hart
explicitly testified that he did not believe that his alleged harasser wanted to
have sex-engage in homosexual activities-with him.73 The court granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no
harassment based on gender.74 The court appeared to assume that a straight
male would not sexually harass another man because to do so would be to
behave contrary to that man's asserted sexuality. Even if Hart's allegations
were true, the court seems to presume that because the alleged harasser did
not appear to want to have sex with the plaintiff, he must have acted with no
intent to sexually harass-that is, with no homosexual intent.75 This is another
71. 235 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. App. 3d. 1987). This case was brought under California's Title VII
equivalent. For the relevant text of California's statute, see supra note 53.
72. Id. at 70.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 71.
75. Id.
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"boys will be boys" case. The statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of gender doesn't apply.76
On almost exactly the same facts, Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation"
produced a different result. Joyner alleged that his supervisor placed his hands
on Joyner's "private parts" and asked him to engage in homosexual
activities.7 8 In addition, two other employees testified to similar accounts of
homosexual encounters with the terminal manager.7 9 It seems that the entire
case hinged on these facts. The court determined that because Joyner was a
male, subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, and "since the evidence
established the terminal manager's homosexual proclivities, the harassment of
which Joyner complained was based upon sex" and thus actionable under Title
VII. Here we have an expression of sexuality that is implicitly homosexual;
we have evidence of the homosexual proclivities of the supervisor. Therefore,
this alleged harasser would do these things because he is a homosexual. This
behavior is something worse than "boys will be boys"-it is an actual
expression of homosexuality in the workplace. That expression is not
acceptable under Title VII.
In Parrish v. Washington National Insurance Co. ,o the court evaluates
both scenarios. A male plaintiff, whom the court described as "presumably
heterosexual," alleged unwelcome and "apparently homosexual" advances by
his male supervisor. There was no evidence that the supervisor was
homosexual, and the record contained evidence to the contrary."1 The court
thus found that Parrish's claims were not actionable under Title VII. The court
continued, however, to note that "If a plaintiff complains of unwelcome
homosexual advances, the offending conduct is based on the employer's sexual
preference and necessarily involved the plaintiff's gender, for an employee of
the non-preferred gender would not inspire the same treatment."2 Based on
76. The following cases deal specifically with a same-sex sexual harassment situation and rule that
Title VII does not apply to that situation. Unless noted in parentheses, the cases do not involve gay
harassers or gay plaintiffs. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing
Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 67 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 576 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
311 (1994); Ashworth v. Roundup Co. 897 F. Supp. 489 (D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882
F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (D.S.C. 1995); Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Nev. 1995); Mayo
v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335 (D. Va. 1995); Myers v. El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (W.D.
Tex. 1995) (involving harasser who apparently was lesbian); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288
(D. Iowa 1995) (holding that Title VII didn't apply because harasser was not gay and noting that
"heterosexual male to male harassment may present issues different from homosexual male to male sexual
harassment"); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769 (E.D. La.
1995); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 1995 WL 386793 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1994); Hopkins v. Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994); Kelecic v. Board of Regents, 1994 WL 702814 (N.D.
I11. Dec. 16, 1994) (harasser apparently lesbian); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790,
796 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
77. 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
78. Id. at 539.
79. Id. at 539 n.2.
80. 1990 WL 165611 (N.D. I11. Oct. 16, 1990) (finding that Title VII applies to homosexual advances,
but that alleged harasser's behavior did not rise to level of harassment).
81. Id. at *3 n.2.
82. Id.
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the same alleged behavior, a straight perpetrator does not engage in sexual
harassment because he is not expressing his sexuality towards the plaintiff; a
gay perpetrator does engage in sexual harassment because he is expressing his
sexuality towards the plaintiff. 3
As noted above, these cases are obviously extreme versions of the
hypotheticals described. That is why they ended up in the courts. But they are
not unrelated to those hypotheticals. They represent the extremes of acceptable
and unacceptable sexual conduct in the workplace. On the one extreme is
heterosexual expression, which is clearly not actionable under Title VII. On
the other extreme is homosexual expression, which is clearly actionable under
Title VII. By making such determinations, these cases create an atmosphere
in the workplace that threatens any expression of homosexuality, including
what was described in the hypothetical, while allowing-if not
encouraging-expressions of heterosexuality, like that described in the
hypothetical. In this way, applying Title VII to cases of same-sex sexual
harassment continues to privilege one form of sexuality-heterosexuality-over
another-homosexuality. "
83. Indeed, courts have become even more explicit in spelling out this rationale. See, e.g., Quick v.
Donaldson Co. 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (D. Iowa 1995) (refusing to apply Title VII in case with straight
harasser and stating that "heterosexual male to male harassment may present issues different from
homosexual male to male sexual harassment.").
In the same-sex sexual harassment cases that hold Title VII does apply, the courts for the most part
find liability explicitly based on the homosexuality of the alleged harasser; that is, a gay supervisor harasses
an employee of the same gender as an expression of his homosexuality in a way that a straight employer
harassing an employee of the same gender would not. In the case of gay harassers and straight plaintiffs,
courts reason that but for the gender of the plaintiffs, they would not have been harassed. This
reasoning-which is difficult to contest-creates an impossible situation for gay men and lesbians in the
workplace, and essentially tells them to keep their sexuality at home. It tells them, in other words, to stay
in the closet. The following cases deal specifically with a same-sex sexual harassment situation and rule
that Title VII does apply. Unless otherwise noted, the alleged harassers in these cases were gay.
Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 1995 WL 420040 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1995) (reasoning that if harasser is gay
and plaintiff is of same gender then Title VII applies); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc. 896 F. Supp. 805
(N.D. Ind. 1995) (reasoning that if male plaintiffs can prove they were discriminated against because they
were men then they can state Title VII claim); EEOC v. Walden Book Co. 885 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Tenn.
1995) (involving male employee harassed by homosexual employee); Griffith v. Keystone Steel and Wire,
887 F. Supp. 1133 (D. I11. 1995) (involving male harasser who harassed only men); King v. M.R. Brown,
Inc. 1995 WL 574308 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs. 878 F. Supp.
229 (D. Ga. 1995) (involving male harasser who harassed only men); Nogueras v. University of Puerto
Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60, 62-63 (D.P.R. 1995) (involving heterosexual female to female sexual harassment);
Prescott v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co. 878 F.Supp. 1545 (D. Ala. 1995) (involving male
harasser who harassed men); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co. 1995 WL 241855 (E.D.
La. Apr. 25, 1995) (involving female to female harassment); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp.
283 (D.D.C. 1995) (involving male employee harassed by male supervisor); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., 1995
WL 316783 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995) (involving gay harasser and gay plaintiff); Ryczek v. Guest Servs.
877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995) (reasoning that Title VII applies if male harasser is gay but not if he is
bisexual); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. 825 F. Supp. 135 (1993) (reasoning that if harasser
harasses only members of one gender then Title VII applies); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F.
Supp. 307 (N.D. III. 1981) (involving quid pro quo sexual harassment by gay harasser).
84. An argument could be made that a less sinister and discriminatory explanation exists for the
different results of these cases. Simply put, the "boys will be boys" cases are cases of hostile work
environment sexual harassment and the cases in which liability is found are quid pro quo cases. Because
hostile work environment cases don't fit so clearly into a sex discrimination rubric-it's harder to prove
"but for gender" causation than in a quid pro quo case-liability is harder to come by, regardless of the
gender of the various players. So, the argument goes, we are comparing apples and oranges: we should
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IV. PROTECTION AT WHAT PRICE?
Part II of this article showed that courts do not use Title VII to protect gay
plaintiffs, or plaintiffs who appear gay. That is, because of the courts' explicit
and consistent refusal to apply Title VII to cases of harassment or
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, while the rhetoric of sexual
harassment law suggests that employees are protected from harassment which
targets their sexuality, they are in reality protected only from harassment which
targets their heterosexuality. By the same token, Part III of the Article showed
that courts do use Title VII to hold gay alleged harassers, or alleged harassers
who appear gay, liable for same-sex sexual harassment. That is, the universe
of same-sex sexual harassment cases reveals that if a gay man and a straight
man are charged with same-sex sexual harassment for the same conduct,only
the gay man will be held liable under Title VII. Thus, Title VII is a double-
edged sword for lesbians and gay men: as plaintiffs, they fall outside the
universe of its protection, while, as alleged harassers, they fall squarely within
its universe of liability.
In order to be eligible for protection, then, plaintiffs and harassers must
conform to the legal system's idea of "normal" sexuality and sexual
interaction: heterosexuality. In providing protection for expressions of normal
sexuality in the workplace, the legal system by definition privileges
heterosexuality while denigrating homosexuality.1
5
As a result of the legal system's heterosexism,"6 efforts by lesbians to fit
into the law's universe of protections often come with the very high price of
sacrificing a lesbian identity free from heterosexist norms. Because the legal
system posits heterosexual relationships as the norm, "'being' lesbian" is
"always a kind of miming, a vain effort to participate in the phantasmatic
be comparing a quid pro quo case involving a straight harasser with a quid pro quo case involving a gay
harasser, and a hostile work environment case with gay harassers with a hostile work environment case
with straight harassers.
Certainly that comparison would be interesting to make-and I would have made it had I been able
to find such cases-but I don't think it would change my argument. Given the courts' explicit reliance on
the homosexuality of a harasser in finding liability, it seems very unlikely that a straight man would be
held accountable under Title VII for quid pro quo sexual harassment of another man. By the same token,
while a group of straight men who create a sexual environment in the workplace targeting another man
are merely boys being boys, gay men who do that would be seen as expressing their sexuality towards that
other man, and would therefore be liable for "but for gender" discrimination. The distinction between quid
pro quo and hostile work environment, then, is interesting but not determinative. The courts will decide
the same way in both types of cases.
85. See Mary Joe Frug, A Postmoden Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1992) ("[B]y directly or indirectly penalizing conduct that does not conform to a
particular set of sexual behaviors, legal rules promote a model of female sexuality; this model is
characterized by monogamy, heterosexuality, and passivity.").
86. Bennett Capers cautions that:
Heterosexism should not be confused with homophobia, which is the irrational fear and hatred
of homosexuality and/or lesbians and gay men. Heterosexism, on the other hand, refers to
institutionalized valorization of heterosexual activity. Heterosexism, like sexism, is supported
by institutions-local, state, and federal law, as well as church, marriage, and the family.
Capers, supra note 11, at 1159.
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plenitude of naturalized heterosexuality." 87 Ruthann Robson calls this the
"domestication" of lesbian existence, when the values of the dominant, legal,
society become "so internalized that they are considered to be common sense."
When this happens,
The barbed wire enclosures seem to exist for our protection rather than
our restriction. We attempt to argue ourselves into legal categories so
that we can be protected, not noticing how such categories restrict our
lesbianism.88
In contemplating whether or not Title VII should be used to prohibit
same-sex sexual harassment, we would do well to draw lessons from other
areas of sexual interaction where state regulations have worked universally to
the detriment of homosexuality. Three examples of such domestication-or
attempts at domestication-outside the immediate field of Title VII provide
important warnings to those who seek to expand its "protection" to victims of
same-sex sexual harassment.
First, there is a strong movement afoot to legalize gay and lesbian
marriage. The argument, on a practical level, is that by forcing our way into
society's most hallowed institution, we will force society to respect us or, at
the very least, we will start to reap the many economic and legal benefits of
that institution. On a more theoretical level, Nan Hunter argues that "the
impact [of lesbian and gay marriage] will be to dismantle the legal structure
of gender in every marriage," due to "its potential to expose and denaturalize
the historical construction of gender at the heart of marriage."89
87. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY
THEORIES 13, 20-21 (Diana Fuss ed. 1991).
88. Robson, supra note 43, at 30 (1993); see also Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian
Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 591 (1990) [hereinafter
Robson, Lavender Bruises] ("Lesbian relationships are not synonymous with heterosexual relationships.
• . . [AIttempting to adapt lesbian relationships to heterosexual ones brutalizes and erases lesbian
existence.").
Judith Butler offers a similar criticism of the construction of "the category of women as a coherent
and stable subject . . . [that] achieve[s] stability and coherence only in the context of the heterosexual
matrix." BUTLER, supra note 20, at 5.
Martha Minow argues that "feminist analyses have often presumed that a white, middle-class,
heterosexual, Christian, and able-bodied person is the norm behind 'women's' experience. Anything else
must be specified, pointed out." Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. OF LEGAL
EDUC. 47, 56 (1988). By making this presumption
[fQeminists make the same mistake we identify in others-the tendency to treat our own
perspective as the single truth-because we share the cultural assumptions about what counts as
knowledge, what prevails as a claim, and what kinds of intellectual order we need to make sense
of the world. Like the systems of politics, law, and empiricism feminists criticize for enthroning
an unstated male norm, feminist critiques tend to establish a new norm that also seeks to fix
experience and deny its multiplicity.
Id.




But at what price? The only gay and lesbian relationships that would
achieve legal recognition would be the long-term, monogamous, stable, "just-
like-heterosexual" ones.9" Therefore, this (very narrowly defined) legal
recognition of lesbian relationships "forces lesbian partners into potentially
damaging attempts to calibrate their lives to conform to heterosexual
models."91 This is domestication at its worst: the dominant society sets out
its hierarchy of relationships, at the top of which is Marriage. Rather than
determining the value of our relationships on our own terms,92 we are led by
the carrot of "Legalized Gay and Lesbian Marriage" to accept the heterosexual
hierarchy and seek desperately to climb to the top.
Second, in the area of lesbian mothers seeking custody of their children,
the legal system's privileging of one "kind" of lesbian over another is brutally
apparent. Ruthann Robson describes a court's denial of overnight visitation to
a lesbian because the evidence showed she was an "active homosexual" with
multiple partners. Robson decries the "violence" of the court's opinion by
noting that the "clinical word 'homosexual' is inflamed with other sexual
transgressions such as 'active' and 'several' partners. Thus, [this lesbian] is
exiled even from the 'good homosexual' category that some courts have
employed" to provide protection for the "monogamous and discreet
'homosexuals.'"93
Third, the issue of domestic violence between lesbian partners offers
another example of domestication. Robson, a leading voice in the movement
to confront the issue of lesbian battering,94 has noted that "to successfully use
90. See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage
Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1993)
("Long-term, monogamous couples would almost certainly be the exemplars of the movement [to legalize
lesbian and gay marriage] .... ).
91. Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal
Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 537 (1990); see also Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians,
Gays and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 117 ("[G]ay sexuality is typically cast
in opposition to the sexual norm of a heterosexually-dominant culture.").
92. For a more in-depth discussion of lesbian identity versus heterosexual norms, see Butler, supra
note 87, at 13. Butler argues that
the negative constructions of lesbianism as a fake or a bad copy can be occupied and
reworked to call into question the claims of heterosexual priority .... Understood in this
way, the political problem is not to establish the specificity of lesbian sexuality over and
against its derivativeness, but to turn the homophobic construction of the bad copy against
the framework that privileges heterosexuality as origin, and so 'derive' the former from the
latter.
Id. at 17.
93. Robson, supra note 43, at 14 (discussing court's denial of overnight visitation to lesbian mother
in Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992)).
94. For more general discussion of the problem of intra-lesbian battering, see RUTHANN ROBSON,
LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 157-70 (1992) [hereinafter ROBSON, LESBIAN
(OUT)LAwJ; Denise Bricker, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman s Syndrome Expert Testimony
for Gay Men and Lesbians who KillAbusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379 (1993); Sandra E. Lundy,
Abuse that Dare Not Speak its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbians and Gay Domestic Violence in
Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273 (1993); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49-52 (1991); Robson, Lavender Bruises, supra
note 88; Angela West, Prosecutorial Activism: Confronting Heterosexism in a Lesbian Battering Case, 15
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 249, 258 (1992).
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a defense based on being battered, a woman must be the stereotypical good
wife. "1 And to determine who the batterer is, courts have to determine which
lesbian is the male, or "the male-identified lesbian."96 So even if the record
shows-or should show-otherwise, courts protect the lesbian partner who
most easily and comfortably fits into the legal system's idea of a "wife" against
the lesbian partner who remains firmly outside the legal system's idea (if a
woman. When a court can't figure out who is who-let's say they're both
femmes or butches-it issues "mutual restraining orders," rather than listen
to the women tell their stories.97
Based on these examples, we can conclude that we have a legal system
that is or may be willing, grudgingly, to provide protection for lesbians who
are: (1) "just like us," that is, in stable, long-term, relationships; (2) inactive,
that is, involved with only one partner, and preferably not sexually; or, (3)
"good wives," that is, identifiable as functioning in the traditionally female
role within relationships. Thus, using Title VII to "protect" for lesbians from
workplace harassment from other women is a risky proposition, subject to
dangerous backfire.9" It would privilege those lesbians who looked and acted
straight, were monogamous and discreet, and had long hair and make-up.
Implicitly, the protection would not extend to those lesbians who were not all
of the above: the "active" lesbians with "several partners" who failed to
conform to a heterosexist view of "feminine. "" The result would be that if
a court is confronted with a "clearly lesbian" plaintiff against a "clearly
straight" alleged harasser, chances are that the plaintiffs case will not come
under Title VII's ambit. If, however, the court is faced with the reverse
scenario-a "clearly straight" plaintiff against a "clearly lesbian" alleged
harasser-the court will likely find that Title VII applies. If the court can't
95. ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAW, supra note 94, at 160.
96. See Robson, Lavender Bruises, supra note 88, at 572-73.
97. See id. at 579-80 (discussing "mutual restraining orders"). Angela West describes heterosexist
assumptions about roles and relationships which prevent incidents of lesbian battering from being prosecuted
as domestic violence cases. She relates a case in which a desk officer had described the two women in a
battering situation as "roommates." West guesses "that the officer's assumption was based on the fact that
[the victim] was a very attractive, feminine woman, the kind who 'could get a man.'" West, supra note
94, at 258
98. This potential for backfire exists in all attempts "outsider" groups make to get "inside." As Janet
Halley has remarked in discussing the argument over whether homosexuality is an immutable characteristic,
"the distinctive and broad effects of litigation, in particular its power to normalize in law and culture any
definitions of homosexuality and homosexuals it adopts, must be measured against the exiguous need for
a doctrinal argument that defines who we are in ways that some of us object to and cannot, and will not,
conform to." Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument
from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 529 (1994).
99. As Nancy Polikoff cautions in her critique of the attempt to legalize gay and lesbian marriage,
such an agenda will
require a rhetorical strategy that emphasizes similarities between our relationships and
heterosexual marriages land] values long-term monogamous coupling above all other
relationships .... I fear that the very process of employing that rhetorical strategy for the
years it will take to achieve its objective will lead our movement's public representatives,
and the countless lesbians and gay men who hear us, to believe exactly what we say.
Polikoff, supra note 90, at 1549-50.
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figure out who is who, it will have to do some creative reading of the record
to determine what kind of sexuality is being expressed and therefore whether
the legal system provides protection.
Given this likelihood, and the clear heterosexism of the current legal
system, feminists, queer theorists, and lesbian legal theorists should not give
that system another tool to use against us. Allowing the state to regulate same-
sex sexual harassment would strengthen the state's power to "define acceptable
sex. " " We know that attempts to define acceptable sex have led to
continued exclusion at best, and persecution of any expression of non-
heterosexual sexuality at worst. As long as Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, why should we trust the legal
system to apply Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment in anything but a
discriminatory and heterosexist way?
CONCLUSION
Discrimination law is experiencing growing pains as a result of the fact
that more men and women-in the workplace and everywhere else-are out
as lesbians and gay men. Title VII has been a partially effective remedy for
victims of race and sex discrimination and, to a lesser degree, for victims of
sexual harassment. What Title VII has never been able to do, however, is
integrate sexual orientation-either as a part of "sex" or as a category on its
own-into the scope of protection it provides. The law as it stands provides
no protection for lesbians and gay men in the workplace, leaving them open
targets for society's discomfort and phobia about homosexuality.
The starting point, then, must be a statute that provides protection for
lesbians and gay men because they are lesbians and gay men, not because they
have been harassed by lesbians and gay men. Whether that statute takes the
form of an expanded Title VII or a new piece of stand-alone legislation
governing sexuality in the workplace, it must prohibit discrimination and
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation.'' Since there is no such
statute, any "protection" for individual lesbians and gay men would be illusory
and dangerous.
I am not saying that same-sex sexual harassment is not a problem for
lesbians and straight women alike, or that it should be ignored. In crafting the
solution, however, we have to be careful about what tools we use and how we
use them. As Audre Lorde has cautioned, we must learn "how to take our
100. Cain, supra note 28, at 835 (referring to attempts to ban pornography).
101. There have been congressional attempts to expand Title VII to include a prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The most recent is a bill introduced by Sen. Edward
Kennedy (D. Mass.) and Rep. James Jeffords (R. Vt.) which would prohibit both public and private
employers from discriminating against gay men, lesbians or bisexuals either in hiring or in other workplace
practices. The bill has little chance of passing the Republican Congress, but President Clinton has endorsed
it. See, e.g., Hilary Stout, Clinton Endorses Gay Rights BillAgainst Job Bias, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1995,
at B10.
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differences and make them strengths. For the master's tools will never
dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at
his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine
change."102 Patricia Cain has called upon us to listen to and for those
differences by constructing theories that "encourage the right kind of listening,
a listening that privileges (temporarily) the previously silenced."" °3 Listening
to other women's experiential reality, we gain a clearer sense of what "ought
to be."" °
In the Title VII context, that means listening to lesbians, both those in
positions of power ("alleged harassers") and those not ("plaintiffs"). And it
means listening to straight women, both those who have been harassed by men
and those who have been harassed by women. Sexual harassment theory is the
quintessential feminist legal creation, relying on the narrative, experiential
realities of women;05 it is the definitive creature of feminist process. We
must not lose sight of this achievement by transforming it into another tool of
lesbian domestication." °  The critique of male power and female
subordination must be strong enough either to expand to include the voices of
those who experience different realities or to allow an independent critique of
heterosexism and homophobia to evolve. Otherwise, the critique of women's
subordination will not be a useful critique at all."0 7
102. AuDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (1984).
103. Cain, supra note 28, at 844.
104. Id. at 845; see also Cain, supra note 43, at 195 (arguing that by listening to women's stories
we perceive problems correctly and propose appropriate solutions).
105. Id. at 197.
106. Id. at 212-14; id. at 211 (expressing fears that "what started as a useful critique of one privileged
(male) view of reality may become a substitute claim for a different privileged (female) view of reality");
see generally Minow, supra note 88, at 95 (arguing that in fashioning solutions to legal disputes we must
question "existing social arrangements" in order to guard against risk that "new answers" reinforce status
quo).
107. See generally Cain, supra note 43, at 191-92 ("Lesbian experience is essential to the formation
of feminist theory because it stands in opposition to the institution of heterosexuality, which is a core
element of male-centered reality."); Rich, supra note 68, at 647-48 (arguing that feminist theory will be
weakened if it marginalizes lesbianism).
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